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INTRODUCTION
“About the truth and extent of these
facts none but men possessing a spe-
cial knowledge of physiology and natural
history have any right to an opinion; but
the superstructure based on those facts
enters the realm of pure reason, and may
be discussed apart from all doubt as the
fundamental facts” (Jenkin, 1867).
With little modification, these remarks
on Darwin’s evolution theory by a pro-
fessor of engineering with little knowl-
edge of biology, will serve to justify the
present foray of one not possessing a spe-
cial knowledge of neurophysiology into
the domain of memory.
SIZE DOES NOT SCALE WITH
INFORMATION CONTENT
Mother Hubbard spoke authoritatively
when she declared the cupboard bare. She
knew the size and form of bones likely to
satisfy her dog. She also knew the size of
her cupboard. Furthermore, she knew that
bones were stable, uncompressible and,
most importantly, likely to be needed at
short notice by her canine friend. We can-
not speak on human long-term memory
with equal authority. It often appears sta-
ble and can be called upon at short notice,
but beyond these facts we cannot now go.
We can, however, speak about the size of
the metaphorical “cupboard” where, con-
ventional wisdom holds, long-term mem-
ory must lie (Draaisma, 2000). And if the
cupboard proves to be bare, we have to
admit a problem (Forsdyke, 2009).
The cranial “cupboard” might be
expected to be larger than normal in indi-
viduals (savants) with very large long-term
memories. Although some savants are
deficient in other respects (savant syn-
drome), the discovery of just one savant
with exceptionally high long-term mem-
ory and with normal cranial capacity,
but without serious deficiency, would
refute this prediction. It so happens that,
although one much celebrated savant
had a large head, most savants have not,
and some show no serious deficiency;
on the contrary, they show some excep-
tional abilities, including exceptionally
high long-term memory (Treffert, 2010).
Conversely, when the cranium is much
smaller than normal (microcephaly),
long-term memory might be decreased.
Unfortunately, microcephalics tend to
be tested more for intelligence (usually
impaired), than for their ability to recall
information. However, on the assumption
that intelligence and long-term memory
are to some extent related, we can note that
a few microcephalics have normal intelli-
gence (Forsdyke, 2009). Thus, with both
savants and microcephalics, the evidence,
albeit weak, suggests a disconnect between
the volume of neural tissue held within the
cranium and the quantity of information
which that neural tissue is, in some way,
held to store. Size does not matter. Studies
of hydrocephalics are casting new light on
this scaling paradox.
ADULT HYDROCEPHALICS WITH 5%
BRAIN TISSUE BY VOLUME
With savants and microcephalics, the
volume of neural tissue is determined
by cranial capacity. However, with hydro-
cephalics the volume is largely determined
by the size of the fluid-filled ventricles.
A therapeutic shunt in early life can lower
a cerebrospinal fluid pressure that oth-
erwise would relentlessly compress neu-
ral tissue against the cranial surface. In
the 1970s innovations in non-invasive
brain-scanning technology facilitated the
reexamination in adult life of treated
hydrocephalics. The journal Science, under
the title “Is your brain really necessary?”
(Lewin, 1980), described a series of 600
cases with residual ventricular enlarge-
ment that had been studied in Britain
by paediatrician John Lorber (1915–1996).
Again, while long-term memories were
not directly assessed, intelligence quotients
(IQs) were.
Amazingly, in 60 of Lorber’s cases, ven-
tricular fluid still occupied 95% of cranial
capacity. Yet half of this group had IQs
above average. Among these was a student
with an IQ of 126 who had a first class hon-
ors degree in mathematics and was socially
normal. For this case Lorber noted:
“Instead of the normal 4.5 cm thick-
ness of brain tissue between the ven-
tricles and the cortical surface, there
was just a thin layer of mantle mea-
suring a millimeter or so. The cranium
is filled mainly with cerebrospinal fluid.
. . . I can’t say whether the mathematics
student has a brain weighing 50 or 150
g, but it’s clear that it is nowhere near the
normal 1.5 kg.”
Lorber’s findings met much skepticism.
But recently there have been two inde-
pendent confirmations, suggesting Lorber
should not have been so lightly dis-
missed. Under the title, “Brain of a
white-collar worker,” French neurologists
(Feuillet et al., 2007) showed “massive ven-
tricular enlargement” in the brain scan of
a civil servant who had an IQ in the low
normal range and came to them with rel-
atively mild neurological symptoms that
responded to treatment. Shortly thereafter,
neurosurgeons in Brazil reported a similar
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case (de Oliviera et al., 2012). Their fig-
ure (Figure 1) is striking, since it compares
the enlarged ventricles of their symptom-
free subject with the equally enlarged ven-
tricles of a subject with “deep cognitive
and motor impairment”—the more usual
expectation.
PLASTICITY OR PARADOX?
Data from savants, microcephalics, and
hydrocephalics seem to be telling us that,
with respect to long-term memory, there
are circumstances where, paradoxically,
size does not matter. Lorber suggested that
“primitive deep structures that are rela-
tively spared in hydrocephalus” may have
allowed his subjects to live normal lives, so
that “there must be a tremendous amount
of redundancy or spare capacity in the
brain.” This implied that normally much
of the brain is simply idling, ready to act as
a backup should the need arise.
Somewhat more convincing was a
“plasticity” explanation advanced by
Bateson and Gluckman (2011) when com-
menting on the French patient. In similar
fashion, the Brazilian team invoked the
“resilient adaptation of brain networks”
associated with “the ability of neuronal
tissue to reassume and reorganize its func-
tions” (de Oliviera et al., 2012). These
plasticity explanations imply that, in keep-
ing with the sometimes amazing recoveries
reported for severe brain injuries, an
otherwise-occupied part of the brain can
change to compensate for a defective part.
Under the prevailing neural network “con-
nectionist” paradigm (Draaisma, 2000;
Forsdyke, 2009), for hydrocephalics with
only 5% of neural tissue remaining, this
FIGURE 1 | Brain scans of patients of de Oliviera et al. (2012). Normal adult appearance (left),
with “LV” referring to the small black fluid-filled ventricles. Enlarged ventricles (middle and right).
The middle patient is clinically normal, whereas the right patient has had “deep cognitive and motor
impairment since childhood.” Reproduced with author’s permission from Frontiers in Human
Neuroscience under Creative Commons Licence.
would seem to require the establishment
early in life of a critical network, which
would have to retain its connectivity in
the face of the subsequent severe progres-
sive distortion associated with ventricu-
lar expansion. Unfortunately, there are no
post-mortem histological studies on this.
However, theremust be rules for redun-
dancy and plasticity. There must be limits.
It is a matter of elementary logic that,
at some stage of brain shrinkage, these
explanations must fail (Majorek, 2012).
The drastic reduction in brain mass in
certain, clinically-normal, hydrocephalic
cases, seems to demand unimaginable
levels of redundancy and/or plasticity—
superplasticity. How much brain must be
absent before we abandon these explana-
tions and look elsewhere? Perhaps we are
looking a gift paradox in the mouth?
The extent of our neurobiological igno-
rance was recently noted by Eric Kandel
(2006): “In the study of memory stor-
age, we are now at the foothills of a great
mountain range. . . . To cross the thresh-
old from where we are to where we want
to be, major conceptual shifts must take
place.” Regarding the human brain’s “mas-
sive storage capacity” for object details,
Brady et al. (2008) have also challenged
“neural models of memory storage and
retrieval.” Others are calling for “radi-
cal modification of the standard model
of memory storage” (Fusi and Abbott,
2007; Firestein, 2012). Given the doubts
of these specialists, perhaps it is time for
other hypotheses to be admitted to the
table of responsible neuroscientific dis-
course. Should we not be looking fur-
ther afield—alert for rare gift horses (van
Heerden, 1968; Pribram, 1991; Talbot,
1991; Berkovich, 1993)? Metaphors may
help.
FROM STAND-ALONE TO CLOUD
COMPUTING
In 1934 librarian Paul Otlet (1868–1944)
envisioned a “mechanical collective brain”
to which individuals could connect
through “electric telescopes” that would
seem to equate with today’s personal
computers (Levie, 2006). And in 1970
at the first international conference on
“Man and Computer,” computer engineer
John McCarthy (1972) sketched out how
the “home informational terminal”—a
console—might one day retrieve personal
files from, and store personal files to, a
central resource—now known as “the
cloud.” However, when personal com-
puters appeared in the 1980s they were
essentially stand-alone, with their own
software and data-storage (memory). It
was easy to relate this, metaphorically, to
the perception that an individual human
brain is a stand-alone entity, with its own
software and memory (Draaisma, 2000;
Noll, 2003). Indeed, concerning “general-
ized cognition-space,” Lenneberg (1965)
had pointed to doubts raised by logical
analogy:
“There is, however, another line of argu-
ment that induces many scholars to sus-
pect a close relationship between brain
size and intelligence. It is based on purely
logical considerations; in fact, the rea-
soning underlying it is by analogy. The
capacities of an electronic computer or
desk calculator are directly related to the
number of its constituent elements. This
engenders the belief that an increase in
the number of units in the brain has a
similar consequence. However, evidence
on this is surprisingly poor. . . . Although
it is entirely possible that the emergence
of language and intelligence are histor-
ically related to the increase in size of
the brain, the case is certainly not yet
irrefutably proven.”
The known stand-alone memory stor-
age alternatives have been reviewed else-
where. For example, although speculation
continues, the idea that long-term mem-
ory might reside in brain DNA is largely
put to rest (Forsdyke, 2009). The ques-
tion of a role for non-DNA polymers
remains. Broadly, this category includes
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other macromolecules (RNA, protein,
lipid, carbohydrate), or unknown sub-
atomic forms perhaps related to “quan-
tum computing” (Sciarrino and Mataloni,
2012). Also in this category is the attrac-
tive idea of the brain as a three dimen-
sional holographic storage network (van
Heerden, 1968; Pribram, 1991; Draaisma,
2000). But, before seeking such exotic
storage modalities, we should ensure that
the brain “cupboard” is indeed bare of
forms more in keeping with current
paradigms. We need a better inventory of
brain-specific macromolecules to exclude
a polymeric form that, DNA-like, might
store information digitally (Tsien, 2013).
Furthermore, although brain information
might be stored in some subatomic form,
at some point that form would need to
interface with more conventional macro-
molecular species (e.g., proteins). Specific
adaptations for this role should distinguish
them from other macromolecules.
For all these storage alternatives, the
thinking is conventional in that long-term
memory is held to be within the brain, and
the hydrocephalic cases remain hard to
explain. Yet currently most of us, includ-
ing the present author, would prudently
bet on one or more of the stand-alone
forms. The unconventional alternatives are
that the repository is external to the ner-
vous system, either elsewhere within the
body, or extra-corporeal. The former is
unlikely since the functions of other body
organs are well understood. Remarkably,
the latter has been on the table since at
least the time of Avicenna and hypothetical
mechanisms have been advanced (Talbot,
1991; Berkovich, 1993; Forsdyke, 2009;
Doerfler, 2010). Its modern metaphor is
“cloud computing.”
Even though the internet emerged in
the 1990s (Berners-Lee, 2010), it took two
decades for cloud computing to become
established (Furht, 2010). Imaginative
attempts to relate this to the work-
ings of individual brains (Talbot, 1991;
Berkovich, 1993), still fall far short on evi-
dence (Forsdyke, 2009). However, the rare
hydrocephalic cases described here suggest
we should exercise caution when tempted
to cast aside the astonishing idea of per-
sonal information—long-term memory—
being remotely stored. After all, Nature is
not obliged to conform to our preconcep-
tions. And, as Sherlock Holmes once said,
“when you have eliminated the impossible,
whatever remains, however improbable,
must be the truth.”
The importance of this extends far
beyond neuroscience and the clinic. When
speaking of extracorporeal memory stor-
age we enter the domain of “mind” or
“spirit,” with corresponding metaphysical
implications (Crick, 1995; Draaisma, 2000;
Forsdyke, 2009). We begin to “secular-
ize the soul” (Hacking, 1995). Thus, there
may be vestiges of truth amongst the dross
that we poor creatures, imprisoned within
the second decade of the twenty-first cen-
tury, can comprehend no better than those
imprisoned in the later decades of the
nineteenth century would have compre-
hendedGregorMendel, had they known of
him (Cock and Forsdyke, 2008). And that
which is now deemed metaphorical may
not always remain so. Draaisma (2000)
notes that metaphors can die and become
literal. There are those who urge us to lift
our eyes to new horizons (Talbot, 1991;
Berkovich, 1993). While they may lack a
formal training in neuroscience, we should
listen carefully.
SUMMARY
Thematerial bases of information—paper,
computer discs—usually scale with infor-
mation quantity. Large quantities of infor-
mation usually require large material
bases. Conventional wisdom has it that
human long-term memory locates within
brain tissue, and so might be expected
to scale with brain size which, in turn,
depends on cranial capacity. Large mem-
ories, as in savants, should always require
large heads. Small heads should always
scale with small memories. While it was
previously concluded that neither of these
predictions was invariably true, the evi-
dence was weak. Brain size also depends
on ventricle size, which can remain large
in some survivors of childhood hydro-
cephaly, occupying 95% of cranial volume.
Yet some of these have normal or advanced
intelligence, indicating little impairment
of long-term memory. This paradox chal-
lenges the scaling hypothesis. Perhaps we
should be looking further afield?
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